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The Benefit-Cost Dilemma 
Daniel  W. Bromley 
Previous speakers have discussed the water resource situation 
from  several  perspectives.  We  have  heard  about the expected 
conflicts over water use, we have heard about water quality and 
quantity issues,  and we  have  heard from a distinguished legal 
scholar about the institutional environment of water allocation 
in the West. It is my task to turn your attention to the evalua- 
tion  process wherein  changes  in  the status quo would be con- 
sidered.  I  come with a message quite unlikely to gladden your 
heart. To be blunt, I  come  to remind you of  the conceptual 
and  empirical  difficulties  inherent  in  a  benefit-cost  analysis. 
This is not a tirade against agency benefit-cost practices-though 
I  will  take  a  friendly  jab  from  time  to time.  Rather it is  a 
reminder to economists and politicians that one of our favorite 
analytic devices is not only theoretically weak, but operationally 
deficient in several important respects. 
Before  proceeding  it  would  seem  helpful  to clarify  some 
terminology. The term benefit-cost analysis is often applied  to 
both a process and a decision criterion. One can easily advocate 
a  benefit-cost  approach,  while  remaining  mindful  of  serious 
problems in  the theory from which such an approach derives. 
The term "analysis" when  added  to "benefit-cost" connotes 
rigor  and sophistication  that, in many cases, is without justifi- 
cation. 
Finally,' the benefit-cost  criterion is  usually  taken to mean 
the condition that present-valued benefits exceed present-valued 
costs. 
Hence, while  I  am pessimistic about benefit-cost analysis in 228  Daniel W. Browzley 
the conventional sense of  that phrase, do not assume that I am 
critical of a benefit-cost  approach. For who can be opposed to 
well-intended  attempts  to ascertain  the implications of  given 
public actions? 
To anticipate somewhat, I will argue that conventional benefit- 
cost analysis is quite ill-suited to the resolution of coming con- 
flicts  over  increasingly  scarce  water resources in  the West. To 
accomplish this I will first outline the historical setting that gave 
birth and sustenance  to traditional benefit-cost analysis.  I will 
then turn to a brief prognosis of how the future will differ from 
the past. Next, I will present the conceptual and empirical prob- 
lems from whence my concern and pessimism  arise. Following 
that I will summarize the type of evaluational approach that is 
best suited to the conditions that we can expect to prevail. 
The Historical Setting 
To appreciate the several ways in which the future will differ 
from  the past-and  therefore  to anticipate  the ways in  which 
benefit-cost  analysis  must adapt-it will  be  helpful  to remind 
ourselves of the political and economic conditions that existed 
between the late 1930s and the early 1960s. 
We  must  remember  that  this  period  followed  by  scarcely 
ninety years the great burst of expansion and building that re- 
sulted  in  the settlement  of  the vast  majority of  the western 
frontier.  During  this  process,  impatience  was  the byword. If 
local  conditions were not suitable for some particular activity, 
people simply  moved  on to another place. Clearly capital was 
scarce compared to good sites-as was labor. It made little sense 
to spend time, money, and labor modifying any given site since 
the  frontier promised many other propitious locations. However, 
as the frontier began to disappear, and as the better sites were 
occupied, successive waves of newcomers were left with less and 
less  happy  prospects.  As  settlement  doubled back on itself, it 
became less easy simply to move to a better place. 
As  this happened, people's thoughts turned from movement 
to modification. If an area was intermittently too swampy for 
farming one did not move  but began  to drain the swamp-an 
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claim in a more favorable location. If the only agricultural land  .  - 
remaining was too arid for crops, then thoughts turned to bring- 
ing water to the land for irrigation. If  periodic flooding made 
life  hazardous and uncomfortable, then it was time to "solve" 
the  problem  by harnessing  the river. These  modifications  be- 
came increasingly attractive as state and federal agencies evolved 
to plan them, construct them, and arrange for the general public 
(taxpayers) to bear the vast majority of the expense. These facts 
significantly  altered the relative  cost of moving vis-his modi- 
fication. 
Having recently read Michener's Centennial  I am struck once 
again by the overwhelming entrepreneurial energies of these early 
settlers. A landed aristocracy simply had  no time to develop- 
in  spite  of  the diligence  of  English  capital,  Texas savvy,  and 
frontier "justice
v-for  there  were  hundreds  of  Potato Brum- 
baughs anxious to build a ditch, string a fence, plow a field, or 
dig a well if  it would make local conditions a little more favor- 
able. 
If  there were unfavorable conditions for the eitablishment of 
a small  class  of  land owners, then it tells us something of the 
nature of  property rights over certain valuable resources. Water 
was there for the taking, and land was too, although to a lesser 
extent. And, once its value was recognized by the early users, 
then they set about to alter the legal structure to protect their 
newly acquired wealth. When we mention the evolution of prior 
appropriation  water  rights  we often forgct that early  settlers 
simply took water that they wanted, and then thought of ways 
to  protect  their  current  use  against  future  claimants.  They 
appropriated  resources  when  property  rights  were  vague  or 
undefined  and  then created property rights to legitimate what 
they had done. 
As this process of modifying the surroundings was in its early 
stages,  the  Great  Depression  struck.  Now,  more  than  ever, 
there was a legitimate role for government capital and technical 
expertise. Politicians quickly learned  that it was helpful to be 
able to deliver  public works to impoverished districts. Early on 
these were limited to a few irrigation projects, and some flood- 
control structures.  Benefit-cost analysis-or any facsimile of it- 
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no  concern  for  the  favorable  and  unfavorable  impacts.  Of 
course, the presumption was that they would allow local farmers 
to improve their crops-or grow them where it was previously 
impossible-or that it would stop the flooding each spring. But 
there  was  no systematic  attempt to judge  the beneficial and 
adverse effects to the nation. 
With  the Flood  Control Act of 1936 there first came some 
language to the effect that projects could be considered worth- 
while if  the benefits exceeded the costs. But of course there was 
no legislative  guidance given  on what was to be a benefit and 
what was to be a cost. In a sense, it was an early precursor to 
the approach  taken in  the National  Environmental Policy Act 
of  1969.  As  you  know,  this  act  requires  an  environmental 
impact  statement  for  every  "major" federal  action  that will 
have a "significant" impact upon the natural environment. The 
parallels continue. Just as we were (and still are) unsure exactly 
how  to measure  the full range of  possible  environmental im- 
pacts, early economists were not well equipped to provide im- 
mediate and expert advice on what was a benefit, what was a 
cost,  and how they might be measured.  Indeed, it took over 
twenty  years  for  the first comprehensive  treatise on benefit- 
cost analysis to  emerge.' 
Hence,  benefit-cost  analysis  was a creature of  the political 
process; the result of  politicians demanding something that no 
one yet knew how to  deliver. Benefit-cost analysis is, therefore, 
the result of a search for economic answers to political choices. 
The  tortured  political  history of benefit-cost practices  in  the 
United States is ample evidence of this fact.2 The benefit-cost 
analyst-as well  as  the benefit-cost approach-has always been 
malleable to the wishes of  those currently holding positions of 
power. 
These  two  situations  taken  together-an  exuberance  for  - 
modifying one's  immediate surroundings, and the fluid nature 
of the  evaluation method for such activities-render it impossible 
to speak of benefit-cost analysis. There were as many different 
benefit-cost  analyses  as  there were  projects and analysts; the 
only constant seems to be the use of a ratio of benefits to  costs 
to  determine the presumed soundness of any particular proposal. 
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cost approach and the benefit-cost criterion. 
The criterion  has  remained  the same; a project must have a 
ratio  of  benefits  to costs in  excess of  unity to merit further 
consideration. A high ratio was not sufficient to insure success, 
but a ratio less than unity was sufficient to insure oblivion. But 
it is the approach that has differed. While the discount rate has 
received  most of  the attention, analysts were playing a multi- 
tude of tricks with assumptions about flood frequencies, flood 
rating  curves,  crop  yields,  normal  prices,. demands  for  elec- 
tricity, recreation use, and the like. There is  (and was) infinite 
scope for maneuvering and the finely tuned imagination of the 
agency  benefit-cost analyst was  nourished  on the challenge of 
meeting the one constant-a ratio in excess of  unity-for those 
projects that had the requisite political support. 
While  academic  economists  complained  of  such  practices, 
agencies and politicians  blithely  continued  on their way. It is 
true  that  BCA  was  useful  in  separating  the  clearly  inferior 
projects from those that were more reasonable, but its primary 
role has been one of legitimating political decisions. In a mood 
of  expansion and invincibility it was easy  to rationalize this; a 
young rich  nation can afford to rush ahead. It was not so criti- 
cal  that the optimum  optimorum be found. It was enough to 
avoid  the minima. We  can be rather confident that the process 
of carrying out a benefit-cost study-even if  badly performed- 
was helpful in avoiding the most serious mistakes. 
But  if  this was the past, what of  the future? Are the same 
imperatives there to harness nature? Is it still considered smart 
to use every drop of water as envisioned by Potato Brumbaugh? 
Are the same things still scarce? 
The Future 
If  the  past  can  be  characterized  by enthusiastic  growth, 
resource  abundance,  political  opportunism,  and  the  absence 
of  active  interest  groups,  the future will  be characterized  by 
economic stability if  not contraction, resource scarcity, political 
caution  and inertia, and a multitude of active special interests. 
The problems  for benefit-cost  analysis  in  this new  setting are 
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The life-cycle of national development is traditionally one of 
early reliance upon  extractive resources and agriculture, eventual 
transition  to more industrial  activity, and then a gradual shift 
to the  tertiary  sector  (services).  While  the  West  will  remain 
oriented  toward  extractive  resources  and  agriculture,  it will 
nonetheless  become  the center  of  myriad service activities as 
well; the climate virtually assures that. With  this transition will 
come some changes that may look like economic decline. The 
extractive industries  will  become less  important.  Land will be 
converted  from agriculture  to suburbs.  But  the overwhelming 
impression  will  be  one  of  moderation, of  slowing down; the 
boom days of the 1940s and 1950s are probably past. 
Instead of a period in which we are preoccupied with "putting 
natural resources to work"  in the traditional sense, we are enter- 
ing a period in which those resources will be used but not con- 
sumed. The modification of our environment to  suit the whims 
of a few farmers, ranchers, or miners is a thing of the past. 
Related  to this is the issue  of  resource  scarcity.  The early 
period  under discussion was one of apparent abundance of  na- 
tural resources  merely  waiting  to be utilized. Whether timber, 
land, minerals, or water, the abundance of natural wealth was 
rarely  in  doubt; the  problem  was  simply  one  of  controlling 
those  resources  and  getting rich. Without going into detailed 
analysis of relative scarcities now vis-&-vis  the past, it is safe to 
say that the sheer demands placed upon those resources now by 
a  large  number of potential users renders them scarce. It is an 
axiom of economics that as items become more scarce and valu- 
able  we  will  observe greater  attention being devoted  to their 
definition,  their ownership, and their use.  Surely  the interest 
in water, land, air, and scenery attest to  their perceived scarcity. 
The third  major difference we will observe in  the future is 
that of a transition from political opportunism based upon ex- 
ploiting resources to political opportunism based upon protect- 
ing them;  the current governor of California is perhaps the arche- 
typical  opportunist  in  this regard. The platitudes and cliches 
will  still  abound, but the message will be one of "save" rather 
than utilize and consume. We are being told-correctly I believe- 
that the future of the United States is to be found in cautious 
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sumptions  that  our salvation  lay with  our ability to conquer 
nature. The more important contrast for our purposes is, how- 
ever, the difference in policy formulation.  Early on there were 
few  vested  interests  in  the status quo-ignoring  of  course, as 
we always have  done, the interests of  Native Americans. Who 
was there to object when Potato Brumbaugh utilized irrigation 
water  that  otherwise  would  flow into Wyoming, or Arizona, 
or  California?  Who  was  to object-except  some  illegal  cattle 
ranchers-when  the homesteaders arrived? What interest group 
was  there  to protest the mutilation  of streams and  forests in 
the search for gold? And this brings us to the fourth significant 
fact that distinguishes the past from the future. 
In the early days there was no politically represented interest 
group able to mobilize opposition in the face of a threat from 
some resource user (or abuser). This of course is not to say that 
hundreds  of  thousands of  individuals  were  not seriously  hurt 
by  the helter-skelter  rush  to "tame the West." Ranchers had 
trails bisected  by farms and fences; others had  previously used 
water taken from  them at will; still  others saw resources that 
they thought were theirs appropriated by someone else. In part 
this  is  a  result  of  the  ill-defined  property arrangements that 
existed  over such  resources.  In  a sense  they were open-access 
resources to be used by whoever was there first, or who had the 
strength to protect their interests whether or not they were first 
in time. 
From a sense of open access we have now moved to one of 
common  property resources in  the correct  use  of  that term.3 
That  is,  common  property  connotes  a  situation  of  coequal 
ownership-each member of  the polity possesses some property 
(claim)  in  the resource.  Under  open  access  no one has  any 
property since no one has a secure claim over the benefit stream 
arising from the resource.  Under  common property every one 
has property since all have some claim to the benefits. The na- 
tional  forests  are  a  prime  example  of  common  property re- 
sources; all of us are coequal owners of  them in the sense that 
we may use them whenever we please. The fact that we may not 
cut  down  a  tree  at  our  leisure  is  no more  relevant  for  the 
property right than is  the fact that I may not sell petrol in my 
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call our "property,"  and the fact that I cannot cut a tree in the 
national forest is simply proof of the fact that all of us are co- 
equal owners; your trees are protected from my chainsaw, my 
scenic canyon is protected from your desire to search for gold 
there. One form of our individual liberty is  protected by a re- 
striction on other liberties.  Such is  the nature of  civilization as 
distinct from anarchy and chaos. 
Hence we  may safely  characterize  the future as a period of 
careful attention to one's interest in the status quo. If  the past 
can be characterized  by an impatient desire to  change things in 
order  that we  might  be  made better  off, the future may  be 
characterized  by  the desire  to do very  little  to the natural 
environment in order that we not make ourselves worse off. But 
this conservatism  has a less romantic side.  Part of  doing very 
little  is  also  accepting  the status  quo  use  of  resources.  The 
future  will  surely  be  a  period  of  intense  fighting  to protect 
what one already  has, whether it  is  the farmers of  the Texas 
Panhandle  or  the loggers  of  the northern California  redwood 
forests. If  the groundwater gives out then that is someone else's 
problem, as long as it will last another twenty-five years. If  the 
redwoods are gone, so what? City  people can  always  look at 
douglas fir; they won't know the difference anyway. If  we send 
salty  water  to Mexico, so what? If  my wheatfield  replaces a 
breeding  ground  for  some  type  of  wildlife,  what do I care? 
There are more down the road. 
In short there is now a vested interest-and  usually an active 
interest  group-aligned  on  both  sides  of  almost any resource 
issue. The limited opposition of  the past has been altered to  an 
almost  pervasive  opposition  to any change in  the status quo. 
And, against  that is  an equally  determined group of  interests 
seeking change. We  are indeed in an era of "one issue politics," 
but the poor politicians are constantly forced to tally the votes 
for each  of  the multitude of  issues they are supposed to con- 
front. It was infinitely easier to be a politician in the old days. 
Benefit-Cost Analysis: The Problems We Face 
In  view  of  the foregoing,  what implications might we draw 
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most serious conceptual and empirical problems? What  modifi- 
cations are called  for? In what follows I will draw your atten- 
tion to two rather serious conceptual problems in benefit-cost 
analysis; problems that logically follow from its foundation in 
welfare  economics.  Then  I  will  turn to a discussion  of  some 
important  problems  in  performing  benefit-cost  studies; while 
there are some conceptual aspects here, the major issues will be 
empirical in nature. 
There are  two compelling conceptual weaknesses in benefit- 
cost  analysis  that ought  to receive  more attention  than they 
have. The first one pertains to the meaning of a surplus of bene- 
fits over costs. This is  not the familiar criterion problem where 
the argument is whether one should use net present values or a 
ratio of  benefits  to costs. The problem is  much  more serious 
than  that and  concerns  the validity,  for  policy  purposes,  of 
those things called net benefits. 
Simply  put, the entire logic of  BCA rests upon the concept 
of the Kaldor-Hicks  compensation  test. That is,  if  there is an 
economic  surplus  created  by  the  contemplated  change  that 
would  be  sufficient  to  compensate  those  who  oppose  the 
change  (or would otherwise be made worse off  by it) and still 
leave some excess for those who favor the change (or those who 
would be made better off by it), then the change is considered 
economically  efficient.  Compensation is  not required, and ob- 
viously never occurs; it is sufficient to  know that compensation 
could  take  place  and  leave  both  groups-gainers  and  losers- 
better off than if  the change did not occur. The existence of net 
benefits  for  a contemplated  action-or a benefit-cost ratio in 
excess of unity-attests to such a surplus. This is so because on 
the cost side of the ledger we supposedly enter all of the debits 
incurred. 
The logic has a certain beguiling aspect to it. If  each project 
undertaken  makes  us  better  off  then how  can  we  lose? The 
problem arises when we ask who it is that is made worse off by 
the change, and who gains? A benefit-cost study of large-scale 
agricultural  mechanization  could  no doubt  show  substantial 
positive  benefits-as long as we assumed  that all  of  those dis- 
placed were able to find gainful employment elsewhere. But as 
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are playing games with ourselves. As long as we assume that the 
losers  of  any change will  be able  to adjust, and as long as we 
assume that the new surplus accrues to the nation rather than to 
a  few  fortunate  gainers  able  to reap  situational  rents,  then 
benefit-cost  analysis as ordinarily  practiced  is  merely  a legiti- 
mating  device  for  making  a  few better off  and many others 
worse off. This is compounded by the realization that it is the 
already advantaged-economically and politically-who are able 
to mobilize government in their behalf. BCA is often the lubri- 
cant of politically sanctioned greed. 
Applied  welfare  economics-from  which  BCA  derives-is 
silent on the matter of costs and benefits received by individuals 
of  vastly  different  initial income positions; a $10 income loss 
is considered the same to a $40-per-week migrant as it is to the 
owner  of  800 acres of strawberries. The average citizen knows  - 
better, but we somehow avoid confronting this in our analy~is.~ 
Given  this problem, the application  of  benefit-cost  analysis is 
quite  consistent  with  making  the  rich  richer  and  the  poor 
poorer. The rich  are unlikely to protest, and few listen to the 
poor. 
The second  major  conceptual  problem is  only  rarely  men- 
tioned by economists.  Any configuration of  prices, production 
possibilities,  demand  curves,  and  supply  curves  rests  upon a 
technical  and  institutional  foundation  that defines what is  a 
resource, indicates who owns what, and defines the accumulated 
technology  (tools and knowledge)  that allows the transforma- 
tion  of  inputs  into outputs.  In  more  technical  language  the 
production possibility frontier, the utility  possibility frontier, 
and the grand  utility frontier are all uniquely defined  by the 
current  distribution of  income,  by  the current ownership  of 
capital  and natural resources, and  by ,the current structure of 
prices. 
Governmental programs to dam rivers, dredge channels, and 
deliver  irrigation  water to farmers alters the very structure of 
resource  endowments  and  prices  that define  the basis  upon 
which  we evaluate  that change. We  use  an efficiency  analysis 
to evaluate basic changes in economic structure-the import of 
which is to  alter economic advantage among competing interests. 
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entire  economy. The  counter  argument  is  that  we have  just 
experienced  forty  years  of  rather  significant  public  works 
projects. Any one project may  have  been  marginal; in the ag- 
gregate the impacts are clearly nonmarginal. 
Each time a benefit-cost study is carried out we are forced to 
assume  away  certain  things.  The  difficulty  of  this  practice 
should  be obvious when conducted on a large scale. When  the 
private sector conducts a benefit-cost study of  some contem- 
plated change it is quite reasonable to assume away those things 
beyond the domain (andlor control) of  the firm. But for BCA 
performed for public-sector activities we cannot be so cavalier. 
Yet  the  conceptual  and  computational  requirements  dictate 
that many things be excluded. 
The basic problem, however, is that an efficiency calculus is 
being  employed  to judge  the desirability  of  public  sector  ac- 
tivities  that change the distribution  of  economic and political 
advantage. In an era of scarcity and confrontation this fact will 
assume greater significance. 
A third problem concerns the correct computation of project 
costs.  In  the conventional wisdom of benefit-cost analysis it is 
always  the  benefit  measurement  that causes  problems, while 
the cost  side  is considered  rather straightforward. But this is 
far  from  the  truth.  Consider  the following example. Assume 
that  in  any given  budget  period  there are n  possible  projects 
that might be undertaken: XI, X2, . . . , X,.  If  we assume that 
the public-sector  budget is derived from the number of attrac- 
tive  looking projects,  then the correct decision rule is to keep 
authorizing  projects  until  the benefits of  the last project  are 
just equal to the costs of that last project; such costs being given 
by the social value foregone by having those funds spent in the 
public sector rather than in the private sector. We might express 
this as: 
The last project accepted: B(Xi)  = B(Xo) 
where: B(Xi) = the benefits of the marginal project 
B(Xo) = the  benefits  to society  of  leaving  the 
costs of  project  Xi in the private sector 
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Here  there is  no effective  budget  constraint; the constraint 
on  the  public sector is  simply the number of  projects it can 
generate  that are  more attractive than  the investment  oppor- 
tunities in the private sector. Labor and capital used in the two 
sectors would be costed out in a similar fashion, and we search 
for the optimal mix of investments between the two competing 
sectors. 
The actual situation is,  of  course, quite different from that 
depicted.  A  more  realistic description  would  start  with  the 
recognition  that the public sector budget is not determined in 
the manner just described.'  Rather, the size of  the budget is a 
predetermined  political  choice  reflecting  the combined  views 
of  the  executive  and  legislative  branches  on such  issues  as: 
(1) expected federal revenues, (2) expected demands for other 
(non-public-works) spending, (3) anticipated needs for stabiliza- 
tion actions by the federal government, and (4) the general role 
of  the  public  sector in  a  market economy. Once the general 
level of public-works spending has been decided-and along with 
that some  general  guidelines  concerning  the types  of  public 
projects to be performed-then project selection consistent with 
those guidelines may proceed. 
But in  this formulation  the cost of any given project is dif- 
ferent from the previous description. Here, the social cost of a 
certain project is not its drain on funds from the private sector 
or,  rather,  it  is  not the social  benefits  foregone by diverting 
those  funds from  the  private  sector.  Now,  a  given  project's 
costs  are  the benefits  foregone  by  not  building  some  other 
project with public funds. This would be expressed as: 
The last project accepted: B(Xi) > B(Xi+,  )  with the public 
works budget ex- 
hausted 
Instead of a search for the marginal project in terms of private- 
sector  funds  diverted,  the search  here is  for the best  mix of 
projects up to the point that the previously determined budget 
is fully utilized. 
A problem that flows immediately from the above discussion 
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the literature on the discount rate for public actions, I have yet 
to see  a  discussion  of  the distinction  between  public invest- 
ments  and  public  rule  changes.  We  are  all  familiar with the 
usual arguments that when the public sector undertakes an in- 
vestment the benefits and costs should be converted to present 
values  by applying a discount rate. Some economists advocate 
the use  of  a  rate  reflecting  the  private  opportunity  cost  of 
capital.  Others  prefer  the  social  opportunity  cost  of  funds 
diverted from the private sector; the difference  here is that the 
former reflects the costs borne by the private sector to acquire 
funds, while the latter reflects the social benefits given up when 
funds are taken away from the private sector. Yet another rate 
that is often advocated is that at which the public sector must 
borrow funds; this would tend to approach the interest rate on 
long term government bonds. And,  there is often some sympathy 
for using a discount rate that reflects "society's  willingness to 
trade  present  for  future consumption." This might  be a  rate 
that would  be determined  by a  number  of avenues, including 
direct survey techniques. 
There is a further refinement in the above debate that recog- 
nized  that we  might wish  to use  one rate for the cost side of 
projects and another for the benefit side. The logic here is to 
discount projects costs at a rate that reflects the higher cost of 
diverting funds from the private sector but to discount project 
benefits at a lower rate that reflects society's rate of time pref- 
erence for  the consumption  of  those beneficial  aspects.  Here 
there are also advocates of one rate for certain types of project 
outputs, and another rate for others. An example might be a 
fairly  low  rate for recreational  outputs that the private sector 
would be unlikely to provide and a higher rate for those outputs 
where there  is  a reasonable expectation of a private substitute 
in the absence of the public alternative. 
However,  in  all  of  the debate  over  interest rates you will 
not find  any  reference  to the public sector as a  rule  maker. 
There  are  three  types of  rule making activities of  the public 
sector along a continuum from: (I)  rules to facilitate individual 
action toward  socially desired  norms, (2) rules to induce indi- 
vidual action to be more consistent with social preferences and 
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preferred directions. Although the expenditure of public funds 
may  accompany the promulgation  of  each of  these, it is also 
possible that each may arise without any public expenditures at 
all. 
What  are  some  examples  of  these  three  types  of  rules? 
Facilitative rules would be found when the natural instincts of 
atomistic agents were consistent with social objectives yet there 
were  some existing institutional arrangements-probably  carry- 
overs from an  earlier  time when  the current  problem did not 
exist-that  impede  individuals  from  acting  quickly  on their 
instincts.  A good example today would  be local  zoning ordi- 
nances that establish legal rights to sunlight so that people will 
thus be encouraged to invest in  roof-top solar  collectors free 
from the threat of shade trees. Here government is simply fad- 
tating the self-interested wish to lower private energy costs; not 
incidentally this also serves important social objectives as well. 
Rules to induce behavior are found where individual tenden- 
cies are not as strong as previously, yet action would be taken 
with some minimal help from the public sector. Investment tax 
credits  for  the  installation  of  pollution  control  equipment 
would be an example of rules that induce certain behavior. 
Finally, rules to enforce behavior can be found in the pollu- 
tion-control area, in minimum gas-mileage performance for cars, 
motorcycle helmet  laws, and so on. The rationale here is that 
those in a position to decide on their own will make antisocial 
decisions in the absence of the rules. 
Now,  the  conceptual  issue  is  one of  how  to evaluate  such 
rule  changes? This question is  not an idle one, since I believe 
that the majority of  the adjustments in water use in the West 
will be rule based rather than investment based. What are some 
of the differences? In investment analysis we assume that scarce 
capital  is  being  diverted  from  productive  uses  in  the private 
sector and hence we want to make certain  that the nation is 
not deprived  of  an advantageous investment for the sake of a 
poor one. A rationale for discounting benefits is that one could 
always put the capital in the bank and over the project life be 
able  to earn  interest at the prevailing  market rate. Thus, one 
must compare the present value of the project with the present 
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But what happens in the case of public rule changes? First of 
all no funds are  being diverted  from the private sector to the 
public sector. Second there is no presumption of a return on the 
investment in which one might at least hope for some indirect 
benefits arising from some  previously underutilized resources. 
And, there is no "project life"  after which the benefits cease to 
exist.  Finally, in  public rule changes  we do not select from a 
large  number  of  projects in  order  to achieve  some  bundle  of 
net benefits constrained by a public sector budget. 
In  rule  changes  we  are  instead  dealing  with  institutional 
bottlenecks rather  than technological  bottlenecks; what I  call 
institutional  lag.  When  new  scarcities  arise-new  problematic 
situations-the existing set of incentives and sanctions no longer 
coincide with new  priorities. We  are not trying to innovate in 
the sense of  new  technologies to solve  a problem. We  are, in- 
stead,  fine  tuning  the existing  system  better  to reflect  new 
scarcities.  This  process  has  been  referred  to as  inv~lution.~ 
But there is no "project life" to rule changes-unless a tax-credit 
program will be phased out in five years. There is no front-end 
capital cost requiring funds that might be spent elsewhere. 
What discount rate should be used? What does it mean to  talk 
of  the present value of the benefits when two years from now 
something  else  will  have  changed  requiring  yet another  rule 
change? We  are not constructing a dam to stand for thirty-five 
years, we are dealing with a problem that is most troublesome 
today  in  a  manner that we  hope will  help, but there are no 
implications that next year we will  not have to do something 
else.  Because of  this the calculation of  present-valued  benefits 
from public rule changes via a discount rate is insufficient for a 
decision  criterion, and it is inappropriate  conceptually.  I will 
return to this in a subsequent discussion. 
The  next  problem  we  must  confront  is  that  of  attaching 
values to both inputs and outputs of public actions to  deal with 
new scarcities in  water  use.  In earlier  times, while this was a 
problem, it had less of an impact on analysis than it will in the 
future. As indicated earlier, the history of  benefit-cost analysis 
is one of  exuberance, of a rather slack economy, of  an activist 
public sector, and of  poorly-articulated interests in  the status 
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was said to be justified  if  one could find only $(x + 1) of bene- 
fits,  appropriately  discounted.  In  a sense,  those advocating a 
project were not required to search for all of the possible bene- 
fits from a change, only enough to insure that they exceeded- 
by  a  discrete  margin-the  project  costs.  And  of  course  they 
showed unmatched zeal and ingenuity in this search. But it was, 
nonetheless,  an  incomplete search; they were not forced to go 
as far  afield  in  search  of  benefits as they would have had the 
opposition been more contentious. 
And  this is  precisely  the message of  the future. The day of 
easy authorization for public actions is past, and the pressure  is 
on the calculation of both benefits and costs. As both sides to 
any  issue  press  their  case, the claims and counter claims for 
benefits and costs will probably make an erstwhile analyst for 
the Corps  of  Engineers  appear  as a  paragon of  restraint and 
propriety.  I  do not trust  either  side in  the coming conflicts 
and-more  discouraging-I  am  not  confident  that  economic 
science is sufficiently developed to allow those of us who claim 
dispassion to  separate fact from fancy. 
Related to this, and yet a serious problem in its own right, is 
the disjointedness in time of the realization of benefits and costs 
for different  public actions. That is,  certain  proposed  actions 
will  result in obvious benefits now but costs that may not be- 
come  apparent  until  the  passage  of  a considerable  length  of 
time. Or, some actions will entail obvious costs now but not 
result  in  benefits for, say, twenty years.  Under  these circum- 
stances  it will  be very  difficult to perform sound benefit-cost 
analysis. 
Another serious problem in performing benefit-cost analysis 
in the  future will arise in the specificatio~l  of the proper account- 
ing stance.  The accounting stance is the geographic scope over 
which  benefits  and costs are defined and compared.  In early 
times  where  benefit-cost  analysis  was  primarily  employed  'in 
project evaluation it was rather easy to  demarcate a project region 
I 
or an area of major influence from the planned investment; an 
irrigation project would benefit a portion of one state, or hydro- 
electric power would be available for a multistate area. In such 
instances the political forces were rather clearly identified, and 
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In the new setting-where public rule making will dominate- 
it is not so obvious how one will demarcate regions. The gains 
and losses will be distributed throughout subareas of  the West, 
and  the analyst-not  to mention  the  politician-will  be  hard 
pressed  to make sense out of  the myriad effects. This will not 
only compound  the analytical  task, but it will  prove trouble- 
some for the political process. 
The final problem I wish to discuss is that of the proper cri- 
terion for decisions about individual actions. We  have already 
discussed,  if  only  briefly,  the matter  of  net  present  valued 
benefits  versus  a  benefit-cost  ratio.  In  light  of  the foregoing 
discussion it should be clear that I am not optimistic about our 
ability to perform conceptually and empiric~lly  sound benefit- 
cost analyses for the type of  changes which  will occur in the 
West. If  reallocation of current water use is to be the predomi- 
nant means for facing the future with scarce water then what 
criterion  for such  reallocations  ought  we  to employ?  For  a 
public body to compute net present values for all possible re- 
allocations is a difficult-if  not impossible-task. 
The majority of transfers will be privately arranged, and will 
occur where  the gainers  (those obtaining the water) can com- 
pensate the losers (those giving up water) and still retain a sur- 
plus. This is  the compensation  test again, except that now it 
is actual  rather than merely potential. But there are at least two 
problems with such privately arranged transfers. 
The first  problem is  that we may often find drastically dif- 
ferent  income  positions  as  between  those  who  wish  to buy 
water rights and those who now have them. This difference in 
income may translate into vast differences in power and infor- 
mation. If  those now in possession of water rights have imperfect 
information  about the value of  water in  alternative  uses then 
one of  the important assumptions for trades to benefit  both 
parties is violated. In addition, if  the difference in income and 
information  of  the two parties  is pronounced, then one party 
will  possess far greater  power  in  the bargaining process; again 
one  important  assumption  of  mutually  beneficial  trades  is 
violated.  , 
The second problem relates to the costs and benefits that are 
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water is allocated among competing uses holds important social 
and  economic  implications  beyond  the immediate users.  Not 
only do income and employment multipliers differ among uses, 
but  the structural stability  of  the western  economy over  the 
long run is also at stake. A reallocation of water from agricul- 
ture to the production of  energy from either coal or oil shale 
represents a shift in water from one use that is renewable on a 
yearly  basis  to a use  that is based upon a finite quantity of a 
depletable resource. Once the coal and oil are extracted water 
will  no longer  be needed in  those uses. But if  the agricultural 
infrastructure  has  disappeared  in  the  meantime  the  switch 
back to  agriculture may be more difficult. 
To summarize this discussion about the problems with benefit- 
cost  analysis,  let  us  briefly  consider  a  current issue  of  some 
importance  in  the West-the  reserved  water  rights  of  Native 
Americans.  As  you  know, the Supreme  Court  has  held  that 
their water rights encompass sufficient water for all reservation 
lands that might  be "practicably irrigable." When  we  look to 
benefit-cost analysis for help in this instance what do we find? 
Immediately one of the assumptions of welfare theory is vio- 
lated  in that the basic structure of resource endowments is al- 
tered. The  magnitudes  of  water  are  sufficient  that  this fact 
cannot  be  ignored.  Secondly, an  institutional  change  such  as 
this is  an  example of  the public rule changes discussed above 
where we may not have a "project" in the conventional sense. 
When the change occurs it will be of unknown duration, and the 
difficulties  in  computing  present values are severe.  The third 
difficulty is encountered when we begin to assign shadow prices 
to inputs and outputs. We  can be assured  that the type of agri- 
culture preferred  by the Native  Americans would  differ from 
the highly commercial and capital-intensive agriculture so prev- 
alent  now.  If  this difference  is  pronounced  it  is  possible that 
by  using  conventional  benefit-cost  analysis  the  reallocation 
would  appear  to  be "inefficient." I  emphasize "appear" pre- 
cisely  because  of  the difficulties  we  would  have in  assigning 
shadow prices to the two disparate types of agriculture. Finally, 
what should be done about the appropriate accounting stance. 
Would one conduct analysis on the basis of an individual reserva- 
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Lest  I leave  the impression of our total inability to do any- 
thing,  allow  me  to emphasize  that certain economic analyses 
can  surely  be carried  out. We  can obviously ascertain the spe- 
cific lands that can be "practicably" irrigated. This would take 
the form of farm-level budget studies, with some publicly pro- 
vided irrigation infrastructure. But, this analysis would be at the 
farm or "project" level  and would  merely  be concerned with 
the suitability of specific land for irrigation. 
It  is,  of  course,  unlikely  that  all  reservation  land  that is 
"practicably  irrigable" will  receive  water  under  the Winters 
Doctrine. But neither will that amount be determined by benefit- 
cost  analysis  in  the conventional  sense.  The decision  will  be 
reached  by political and judicial means, with economics being 
employed  to assist  in the search for a reasonable compromise. 
But we cannot forget that this particular reallocation-as with 
the majority of reallocations-is a political one. 
The basic dilemma we face is that we urgently need a thorough 
decision analysis approach that will lead us to make the correct 
decision about water use in the future. Unfortunately the cor- 
rect decision  is unknown and unknowable. Economists have an 
occupational  predisposition  for clear-cut answers to problems. 
I  have  elsewhere referred to this as the deterministic approach 
(Bromley, 1976). I have also argued that policy formulation is 
not deterministic in the pure sense of that word, but is rather a 
dialectical process.  By  dialectical  I mean  a process in which a 
solution  only emerges  as the result of the forces and counter- 
forces brought to bear on a problematic situation. 
The prime difficulty with  the dialectical  process  is that we 
have  no template against  which  to judge  the outcome. What 
results  from such  a process bears no burden for being right or 
correct-it is all we have. Economists-and not  a few politicians- 
are  uneasy  with  this approach, preferring instead  a yardstick 
against which to judge each alternative. The competitive market 
and  a  benefit-cost  ratio in  excess of  unity provide this yard- 
stick for the economist  as well  as for the politician. Unfortu- 
nately, the former rarely  reveal  to the latter the serious flaws 
in the yardstick. When faced with agnosticism most economists 
still prefer false gods. 
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the West  is  the quintessential dialectical problem. It would be 
relatively  easy  to calculate  income created by sector per acre- 
foot of  water and  then to compute the least harmful ways in 
which  to reallocate  water. This is social cost effectiveness and 
our objective would be to reallocate water so as to precipitate 
the least  economic hardship  in  the aggregate. Of  course other 
things will enter the calculations. 
We  are, above all else, a nation of interest groups ever alert 
for  opportunities to enhance  our  comparative  position.  The 
analogue of this is that we also are attentive to  efforts by others 
to gain at our expense. Our nation grew on the nourishment of 
socially sanctioned-and channeled-greed. 
Given  the conceptual and empirical  problems  with  benefit- 
cost analysis, it is expecting too much to hope for deterministic 
answers to the complex water allocation problems we face. But 
if  we are confident enough of the democratic process, the dia- 
lectical approach need not be feared. 
In the  following section I will outline what would be involved. 
Is There Hope? 
The history  of  federal water  policy  is  one of  immense tax- 
payer  subsidies  to construct  large-scale  projects so  that water 
can  be  given  time, space, and form  utility  to local  residents. 
Every taxpayer in the nation has contributed to these costs, and 
a  few individuals  have  been  made very rich in  the process; a 
much larger  number have benefitted to a lesser degree. Only a 
fool would  claim  to know whether or not the nation is better 
off  than if  the money had  not been spent at all,  or if  it had 
been spent on other projects dealing with urban housing, mass 
transit, human nutrition, or whatever. This in spite of a benefit- 
cost ratio in excess of unity for every project for which analysis 
was carried out. 
Such  is the state of benefit-cost analysis. Why should we be 
any more confident of the future? 1 have outlined the reasons 
why I am pessimistic about a deterministic benefit-cost analysis 
that  is  conceptually  and  empirically  sound.  1  stand  by  my 
pessimism. 
But I am not so pessimistic about an approach to water policy 
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cision  of  traditional  benefit-cost  analysis.  Such  an  approach 
would require-first of all-that the  water addiction of Westerners 
be broken. Bricks  in  toilets is  tokenism  when every suburban 
homeowner feels deprived without a year-round lawn. Once the 
presumed  God-given  right to water is  abandoned, we  can  get 
down to business.  But  to continue to focus attention on only 
the supply side is folly. 
Given  the public  sector's  predominant  role in  creating  the 
current problem it  is  only fitting that it  remain active during 
the  painful  transition  ahead. The place to start would  be to 
develop  an  honest long-range  planning capability  within, say, 
the U.S. Water Resources Council to guide the West through the 
hazards ahead. We  must avoid  water reallocations  that render 
useless  capital  investments  now,  only  to find  we need  them 
again once the coal and shale oil have given out. 
Along  with  this  there  could  be  increased  technical  advice 
given  on water-saving techniques in  agriculture,  industry, and 
in  homes. States could enact coordinated tax incentives to en- 
courage  water  saving.  There  could  be  a  variety  of  events in 
which water resource issues would be discussed. There could be 
stepped-up  efforts to recycle water. Units selling water (cities, 
irrigation districts) might institute a small surcharge on water to 
finance research, demonstration projects, and the like. Finally, 
the federal government could undertake a brokerage function to 
facilitate  consensual  bargains  over  water rights transfers; this 
would  also  involve  monitoring  pending transfers for abuse of 
the weak by the powerful. 
In all of this there would need to be an implicit benefit-cost 
awareness. We  can assume that transfers of water rights would 
involve  some private  benefit-cost calculation.  It would  be the 
public sector's responsibility to  assure that these private interests 
coincide with the public interest. 
The basic dilemma of  benefit-cost analysis is that it gives the 
impression of rigor and precision when in fact the truth is largely 
otherwise. It has taken us forty years to realize this; some still 
remain unconvinced. The coming problems in western water re- 
sources  will  require an evaluative  approach  that admits many 
things ignored in traditional benefit-cost studies, and that takes 
a  more honest  account of  those effects that have always been 
considered.  The states and  the federal government will  be re- 248  Daniel W. Bromley 
quired  to work in close harmony. I see no reason why the na- 
tion's  taxpayers  should  object  to increased  funding for such 
activity. After forty years of public works projects the required 
expenses  for what  I  have  outlined  above  will  seem  nominal 
indeed. 
Notes 
1. This is Eckstein's Water-Resource Development. 
2.  See Bromley (1976) and Dorfman (1976). 
3.  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  see  Ciriacy-Wantrup  and  Bishop 
(1975). 
4.  There  are  a  few  exceptions:  Infanger  and  ~utcher  (1974) and 
Freeman (1967). 
5.  For an elaboration of this, see Steiner (1969) and Brornley (1976). 
6.  See Geertz (1963). 
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